Topic lessonTopic: IAM: roles and permission limits
SCPs vs IAM policies: Organizations permission limits and scope
An SCP (Service Control Policy) controls the maximum available permissions for covered principals in AWS Organizations accounts. It does not replace IAM permission grants. Use a member account containing a report role to distinguish organization hierarchy, IAM grants and applicability.
Follow the root/OU/account path and explain its Allow/Deny rules, IAM grants and exceptions such as the management account.
Know IAM grants and explicit/implicit denials. Organizations centrally manages AWS accounts; an OU (Organizational Unit) groups accounts or other OUs. SCPs require all features, rather than consolidated billing alone.
Distinguish the organization root, OU and account
- Organization root → Reports OUOrganization hierarchy; SCPs at this level are on the path.
- Reports OU → Member BAn account within this OU; not a credential or permission-transfer connection.
- Organization root
- Top-level organization container; not an account’s root user.
- Reports OU
- An OU grouping report accounts.
- Member B
- The AWS account containing ReportReader.
The organization root, an AWS account and an account’s root user are different. The organization root and OUs are hierarchy containers; an account holds resources and IAM identities; its root user is a special principal. Management versus member account status also affects SCP applicability.
IAM grants and SCP limits have different jobs
| Dimension | IAM permissions policies and grants | SCP |
|---|---|---|
| Role | Grant or deny access through identities or resources | Limit available permissions of covered principals |
| Attachment | Users/roles or supported resources | Organization root, OUs or accounts |
| Meaning of Allow | Can provide a permission grant | Places an action inside the SCP ceiling, not a grant |
| Reading a report | Needs a suitable grant and other conditions | The action must also be permitted along its applicable SCP path |
Choose an option to see the result and explanation.
Read along the hierarchy and across policies at each level
| Case | Organization root | Reports OU | Member B | SCP-side result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Allow | Allow | Allow | Inside the ceiling; still not a grant |
| B | Allow | No Allow | Allow | Implicitly denied at the OU level |
| C | Allow | Allow plus applicable Deny | Allow | Explicitly denied at the OU |
| D | Allow | Narrow Allow plus FullAWSAccess | Allow | The broad same-level Allow also contributes |
An Allow is needed at every level on the account’s path. Multiple SCPs at the same level contribute their Allows together. A narrow allowlist does not become the sole ceiling if FullAWSAccess remains at that level. An applicable explicit Deny anywhere on the path cannot be canceled by an Allow elsewhere.
Choose an option to see the result and explanation.
Do not treat management, outside and service principals alike
| Principal/configuration | SCP applicability | Caveat |
|---|---|---|
| IAM principal in a member account | Covered | Includes delegated-administrator member accounts |
| Member-account root user | Covered | Not a blanket bypass; specific documented task exceptions are separate |
| User/role in the management account | Not restricted by SCPs | This does not remove the need for other safeguards |
| Service-linked role | Unaffected by SCPs | Do not generalize this exception to every service role |
| Outside principal directly accessing a resource | Resource owner’s SCP does not directly restrict that outside principal | Check separate RCP/resource-policy and other controls |
Direct access by an outside principal differs from assuming a role in member B and requesting as that session. The latter uses B’s role session, so check the SCPs applicable to that principal in B. Resource location alone does not identify the applicable SCPs.
Choose an option to see the result and explanation.
Review the request and hierarchy without changing organization settings
- Identify the caller’s account and management/member/outside status.
- Record the root, every OU and the target account on its path.
- Inspect relevant Allow and Deny across all SCPs at each level.
- Separately check IAM/resource grants and boundary/session/RCP controls.
- Report evidence and unknowns to the organization administrator; do not test by removing SCPs or changing FullAWSAccess attachments.
Check, then explain in your own words
- Explain why SCPs do not grant.
- Separate same-level Allows from restrictions along the hierarchy.
- Check principal ownership and management/service-linked exceptions.
Check your understanding: Does AdministratorAccess bypass a member account’s applicable SCP limits?
No. Broad IAM grants and applicable SCP ceilings are separate.
An IAM Allow does not cancel the applicable SCP path. Fix principal coverage and hierarchy, then separately check the required grants.
Sources and conditions checked
The official references used in this lesson are collected here with their scope, conditions and corresponding sections. Independent expert review and live AWS comparison have not been performed.
Scope and conditionsOrganization root/OU/account, management/member/delegated admin and all-features versus consolidated billing.
Used in this lessonDistinguish the organization root, OU and account Do not treat management, outside and service principals alike
- SCP evaluationChecked:
Scope and conditionsAllow at each root/OU/account path level; union at same level, Deny at any applicable level; broader Allow may defeat a same-level allowlist.
Used in this lessonDistinguish the organization root, OU and account Read along the hierarchy and across policies at each level
- Service control policiesChecked:
Scope and conditionsSCP does not grant; all-features/member accounts/delegated admins/root; management and service-linked role exceptions; resource-account SCP is not direct control of outside principals.
Used in this lessonDistinguish the organization root, OU and account IAM grants and SCP limits have different jobs Do not treat management, outside and service principals alike
Scope and conditionsApplicable request context, explicit versus implicit deny, identity/resource/session evaluation and service exceptions; not a universal union/intersection equation.
Used in this lessonIAM grants and SCP limits have different jobs
- Cross-account policy evaluationChecked:
Scope and conditionsTrusting/trusted account evaluation; assumed-role session requests are made as a role in the target account.
Used in this lessonDo not treat management, outside and service principals alike